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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the recent WTO Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS
Agreement (adopted June 17, 2022), 2 there may be some confusion about the
many options that countries have for overcoming intellectual property
barriers to allow alternative production, distribution, and use of COVID-19
countermeasures. Of course, visibility into the patent landscape for particular
products is essential to understanding freedom to operate in terms of
products, ingredient, and manufacturing processes, and that work is
complicated, though aided by the Medicines Patent Pool
MedsPaL 3 and VaxPaL4 databases and work done by other researchers on
COVID-19 vaccine 5 and therapeutics 6 patents. Overcoming patent barriers
on ingredients will not be a significant barrier if existing, patentowning/licensed suppliers have adequate supplies and will sell at an
affordable price. If compulsory licenses need to be issued that cover
export/import sources of ingredients, the process for gaining freedom to
operate becomes that more difficult.
Jamie Love has previously written a cogent analysis of many of these
alternatives, saying that the then proposed TRIPS Decision was only the fifth
best alternative . 7 This brief analysis summarizes some of the alternatives he
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discussed but lays out a fuller and broader description of alternatives. The
new Decision’s plus-and-minuses for the most part compare negatively to the
described alternatives which include: (1) Article 73 national security
declarations, (2) Article 31(k) competition-based licenses, (3) Article. 44.2
judicial licenses on patents and trade secrets, (4) an Article 30 productionfor-export exception to Article 31(f), (5) Article 6 parallel importation of
countermeasures produced under a compulsory license, (6) regular nonpredominate export under Article 31, (7) Article 31 bis licenses, (8) an Article
39.3 exception to allow disclosure of manufacturing-related data, and (9) an
Article 39.2 public interest/public health exception to trade
secrets/confidential information.

the 5th best option for exports, JAMES LOVE (Mar. 16, 2022) https://jamielove.medium.com/the-quad-wto-proposal-on-covid-19-and-trips-proposal-is-tied-for-the5th-best-option-for-exports-dd8f165efdee.
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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the recent WTO Ministerial Decision on the TRIPS
Agreement (adopted June 17, 2022), 8 there may be some confusion about the
many options that countries have for overcoming intellectual property
barriers to allow alternative production, distribution, and use of COVID-19
countermeasures. Of course, visibility into the patent landscape for particular
products is essential to understanding freedom to operate in terms of
products, ingredient, and manufacturing processes, and that work is
complicated, though aided by the Medicines Patent Pool MedsPaL9 and
VaxPaL10 databases and work done by other researchers on COVID-19
vaccine 11 and therapeutics 12 patents. Overcoming patent barriers on
ingredients will not be a significant barrier if existing, patent-owning/licensed
suppliers have adequate supplies and will sell at an affordable price. If
compulsory licenses need to be issued that cover export/import sources of
ingredients, the process for gaining freedom to operate becomes that more
difficult.
Jamie Love has previously written a cogent analysis of many of these
alternatives, saying that the then proposed TRIPS Decision was only the fifth
best alternative. 13 This brief analysis summarizes some of the alternatives he
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discussed but lays out a fuller and broader description of alternatives. The
new Decision’s plus-and-minuses for the most part compare negatively to the
described alternatives which include: (1) Article 73 national security
declarations, (2) Article 31(k) competition-based licenses, (3) Article. 44.2
judicial licenses on patents and trade secrets, (4) an Article 30 productionfor-export exception to Article 31(f), (5) Article 6 parallel importation of
countermeasures produced under a compulsory license, (6) regular nonpredominate export under Article 31, (7) Article 31 bis licenses, (8) an Article
39.3 exception to allow disclosure of manufacturing-related data, and (9) an
Article 39.2 public interest/public health exception to trade
secrets/confidential information.
TRIPS COMPLIANT ALTERNATIVES FOR OVERCOMING IP BARRIERS TO
COVID-19 COUNTERMEASURES
1. Using Article 73, Members can declare a national security exception
to all relevant intellectual property protections (patents, tradesecrets/confidential information, data protection, copyright, and
industrial design) in light of the COVID-19 pandemic (see, analyses
by Carlos Correa, 14 Alexander Beyleveld, 15 and Fred
Abbott 16). Freedom to operate domestically would be fully enabled,
though there might still be difficulties sourcing ingredients
manufactured in other countries.
2. Using Article 31(k), 17 Members can issue unlimited quantities to
remedy anti-competitive practices, which could include excessive
pricing, refusal to license, and essential facilities doctrine, 18 and can
14

Carlos Correa, Covid-19 Pandemic: Access To Prevention And Treatment Is A Matter
Of National And International Security, SOUTH CENTRE (Apr. 4, 2020),
https://www.southcentre.int/covid-19-open-letter/.
15
Dr. Alexander Beyleveld, The WTO TRIPS Waiver and Essential Security Rights in
2022, South Centre (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.southcentre.int/southviews-no-235-10march-2022/.
16
Frederick Abbott, The TRIPS Agreement Article 73 Security Exceptions and the
COVID-19 Pandemic, SOUTH CENTRE (Aug. 2020), https://www.southcentre.int/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/RP-116-reduced_1.pdf.
17
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 32(k), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“Members are not obliged to apply the conditions
set forth in subparagraphs (b) and (f) where such use is permitted to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive. The need to correct
anti-competitive practices may be taken into account in determining the amount of
remuneration in such cases. Competent authorities shall have the authority to refuse
termination of authorization if and when the conditions which led to such authorization are
likely to recur;”).
18
Brook K. Baker, A Full Description of WTO TRIPS Flexibilities Available to ARIPO
Member States and Critique Of ARIPO’s Comparative Study Analyzing and Making
Recommendations Concerning Those Flexibilities, Global Development Policy Center (Mar.
5, 2019) https://www.bu.edu/gdp/files/2020/05/ARIPO-Member-States-obligations-andflexibilities-under-the-WTO-TRIPS-Agreement-March-2019.pdf.
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also reduce adequate remuneration accordingly. Although a process
to determine anticompetitive behaviour must be followed, it need not
be judicial or require judicial appeal. 19
3. Using Article 44.2, 20 Members can, under domestic law, limit judicial
remedies for infringement of patents to payment of adequately
remuneration. Granting judicial licenses is widely used in the U.S.
under the E-Bay decision 21 and has been done without reference the
requirements of Article 31(f). As Jamie Love has pointed out, some
US E-Bay decisions have allowed for unlimited export 22 whereas
others have involved trade secrets 23 as well as patents.
4. Using Article 30, 24 Members can explore creating an additional
exception to Article 31(f) as had been previously advocated during
the negotiation of the August 30 Waiver Decision 25 and as has been
incorporated domestically in some cases, e.g., Uganda. 26

19
See generally, BURTON ONG, Compulsory Licences of Pharmaceutical Patents to
Remedy Anti-Competitive Practices Under Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement: Can
Competition Law Facilitate Access to Essential Medicines?, in COMPULSORY LICENSING
PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES AND WAYS FORWARD (Reto M. Hilty & Kung-Chung Liu eds.)
(2015).
20
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 44.2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“Notwithstanding the other provisions of this
Part and provided that the provisions of Part II specifically addressing use by governments,
or by third parties authorized by a government, without the authorization of the right holder
are complied with, Members may limit the remedies available against such use to payment
of remuneration in accordance with subparagraph (h) of Article 31. In other cases, the
remedies under this Part shall apply or, where these remedies are inconsistent with a
Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate compensation shall be available.”).
21
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
22
Edwards Lifesciences Ag v. Corevalve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
23
James Love, US Court issues compulsory license for know-how protected as trade
ECOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL
(Jul.
12,
2014),
secret,
KNOWLEDGE
https://www.keionline.org/22535.
24
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 30, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“Members may provide limited exceptions to
the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably
conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.”).
25
Brook K. Baker, Ending drug registration apartheid – taming data exclusivity and
patent/registration linkage, 34 AM. J. L. & MED. 303-344 (2008).
26
Industrial Property Act 2014 (Act no. 3/2014) § 44(e) (Uganda).
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5. Using Article 6, 27 Members can adopt international exhaustion rules
and import products produced under a compulsory license without
deference to any narrow “consent” rule. 28
6. Issuing a regular compulsory license under Art. 31, Members
automatically allow licensees to export non-predominate quantities to
other countries, 29 which might be a credible alternative for producers
in larger countries or that are producing smaller quantities; if relying
on “emergencies or matters of extreme urgency grounds” – clearly
justified with respect to COVID-19 – there would be no obligation of
prior negotiations.
7. Issuing an Art. 31bis, Members can allow production for export
compulsory license with all required notifications and limitations.30
Key limitations include that non-LDC importing countries would
have to notify the WTO of their insufficient domestic manufacturing
capacity (LDCs automatically eligible), differentiate the appearance
of their product (not an issue for vaccines), take some measures
against the risk of diversion (though not nearly as stringent as adopted
in the June 22 WTO TRIPS Decision), strictly limit export to notified
quantities, and file additional notifications. On the plus side compared
to the new Decision, there are no limitations on countries eligible to
produce and export or to import and use (though some countries have
unwisely opted out of importation rights or limited them to national
emergency situations), there is only a single remuneration in the case
of CLs being issued in both the exporting and importing country, and
there is some right of regional export/import in regional groups with
LDC members.
8. Relying on Art. 39.3, 31 countries do not have to allow a form of
protection for regulatory data that would prevent regulatory
27
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 6, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“For the purposes of dispute settlement under
this Agreement, subject to the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall
be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”).
28
Carlos Maria Correa, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
(2nd ed., 2020).
29
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 31(f), Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“any such use shall be authorized predominantly
for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing such use ...”)
30
Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of WTO
Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 14(3) INDIANA INT’L & COMP. L. REV. (2004).
31
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 39.3, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) (“Members, when requiring, as a condition of
approving the marketing of pharmaceutical … which utilize new chemical entities, the
submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which involves a considerable
effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall
protect such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless

BROOK K. BAKER

7
TRIPS-COMPLIANT ALTERNATIVES
authorities from allowing alternative producers to reference or rely on
such data (or the fact of regulatory approval itself) to allow
abbreviated regulatory approval on the follow-on equivalent medicine
(most relevant for small-molecule medicines where bioequivalence or
other evidence is sufficient to establish comparable safety and
efficacy). Countries can also use the language of Art. 39.3 to allow
disclosure of “test and other data” when “necessary to protect the
public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that such data is protected
against unfair commercial use.” According to Third World Network
authors, this language could allow disclosure of manufacturing and
quality assurance data and other information submitted to regulatory
authorities. 32 This disclosure, even if regulated with respect to further
confidentiality and its limited use, could be used to enable
compulsory licensees or others authorized to address public health
needs to more quickly and effectively manufacture alternative sources
of supply. This possibility goes beyond a compulsory licensing
exception to TRIPS-plus data exclusivity and patent-registration
linkage rule adopted in some countries.
9. Relying on Art. 39.2, countries can establish (and frequently have
established) public interest and public health exceptions to tradesecret/confidential information protections – that’s why in the U.S.
there are SEC disclosure requirements, food labeling requirements,
and countless examples of companies being required to disclose
information they might otherwise hope to keep confidential. There is
nothing in Art. 39.2 prohibiting such exceptions for access to COVID19 countermeasures, and the goal of ensuring the right to effectuate
compulsory licenses might often require access to tradesecrets/confidential information given the incompleteness of patent
disclosures to actually effectuate the working of a patent. There have
been numerous calls for creating exceptions to tradesecret/confidential information protections, including a compulsory
licensing alternative that would provide some measure of
compensation.
10. Issuing a patent authorization under the new COVID-19 vaccine
Decision has only a single true advantage – the right to export
unlimited quantities to eligible developing countries only; however,
in addition to eligibility to produce or import exclusions (developed
countries and China and any other developing countries that opt out).
There are numerous notification requirements, stringent antidiversion requirements, the risk of double remuneration, a relatively
short duration of the authorization period (five years admittedly with
the possibility of extension(s), and a stringent requirement that the
steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against unfair commercial use.”).
32
K M Gopakumar, Chetali Rao & Sangeeta Shashikant, Trade secrets protection and
vaccines: The role of medicine regulatory agencies, THIRD WORLD NETWORK (Jun. 2021)
https://www.twn.my/title2/health.info/2021/hi210608.htm.
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authorization be “necessary” to address the COVID-19 pandemic (a
necessity some countries or companies might challenge because of
adequacy of supply, the offer of tiered prices, or subsidized supply
through COVAX or other mechanisms).
CONCLUSION
It is important to note that some of the abovementioned options may be
curtailed by subsequent binding interpretation at the WTO and/or, as South
Centre emphasizes, 33 by bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements, and
investment treaties. In vestment treaties may give rise to investor-statedispute-settlement even when countries decline to exercise state-state-dispute
settlement if they convince arbitrators that their IP rights have been indirectly
expropriated or that they have been subject to unfair or inequitable
treatment. 34

33

Carlos M. Correa, Nirmalya Syam and Daniel Uribe, Implementation of a TRIPS
Waiver for Health Technologies and Products for COVID-19: Preventing Claims Under
Free Trade and Investment Agreements, SOUTH CENTRE (Sept. 2021)
https://www.southcentre.int/research-paper-135-september-2021/.
34
Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, The Incredible Shrinking Victory: Eli Lilly v.
Canada, Success, Judicial Reversal, and Continuing Threats from Pharmaceutical ISDS, 49
LOYOLA CHICAGO L. J. 479, 513 (2017); Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate
Power Unbound Investor-State Arbitration of IP Monopolies on Medicines – Eli Lilly v.
Canada and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 23 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 59 (2015).
BROOK K. BAKER

